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Resumen: numerosas teorías han intentado, en los últimos años, proporcionar bases ade-
cuadas para trazar una distinción entre los deberes de justicia que mantenemos hacia nues-
tros conciudadanos, por un lado, y hacia los ciudadanos de otros países, por el otro. La 
teoría de la coacción de Michael Blake ha supuesto uno de los esfuerzos más relevantes en 
ese sentido. No obstante, el desarrollo reciente de las relaciones internacionales puede 
minar la capacidad de una teoría de la coacción como la de Blake para trazar una línea 
coherente entre la justicia distributiva doméstica y la global. Es cierto que, independiente-
mente de la densidad de las relaciones económicas internacionales de hoy, la coacción que 
estas ejercen sobre los individuos sigue estando lejos de ser tan organizada y predecible 
como la del Estado. Sin embargo, en este artículo defenderé la idea de que si la interde-
pendencia económica global afecta las vidas de los ciudadanos de manera suficientemente 
profunda, el hecho de que esta no esté institucionalizada de la misma forma que la del 
Estado no debería impedir que las mismas obligaciones de justicia que existen a nivel do-
méstico aparezcan también en el plano internacional.  
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Abstract: many theories have attempted, in recent years, to provide adequate grounds for 
a distinction between duties of justice owed to co-citizens, on the one hand, and to for-
eigners, on the other. Michael Blake’s coercion theory has been one of the most promi-
nent of such attempts. Nevertheless, modern developments in international economic 
relations can undermine the ability of a coercion theory like Blake’s to draw a consistent 
line between distributive justice at home and abroad. It is true that, regardless of how 
dense international economic relations are nowadays, the coercion they exercise on indi-
viduals is still far from being as organised and predictable as the state’s. Nonetheless, in 
this paper I will argue that if global economic interdependence impacts the lives of indi-
viduals pervasively enough, the fact that it’s not as institutionalised as the state’s shouldn’t 
impede that the same distributive justice duties that hold domestically also arise interna-
tionally.  
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John Rawls’s Law of Peoples (2001) has been, since its publication, the ground for 
many attempts to distinguish between our distributive justice duties towards fellow 
citizens, on the one hand, and towards foreigners, on the other. Nonetheless, cos-
mopolitans have often found different ways to oppose Rawls’s view by focusing, 
for instance, on the implications of the global economic order. Thus, they have 
built their disagreement with Rawls from the works of Thomas Pogge (1989, et. al.) 
and Charles Beitz (1999, et. al.), among others, by means of arguing that justice 
demands the same for fellow citizens and for foreigners. On the opposite side, 
statists have tried to defend Rawls’s position that duties of justice vary between 
fellow citizens and foreigners, on different grounds. One of such attempts has used 
the liability of co-citizens to a common set of coercive institutions to support the 
claim that fellow citizens owe each other deeper obligations of justice (see Blake, 
2001 and Nagel, 2005). I will focus here on Michael Blake’s proposal in that direc-
tion. 
Blake’s basic idea is that a concern with relative economic shares –economic 
inequality– is a “plausible interpretation of liberal principles” only when those 
principles are applied to individuals who share liability to the same “coercive net-
work of governance” (ibíd.). That doesn’t discard at all other duties of justice to-
wards foreigners. Nevertheless, for those individuals with whom we share only 
“common humanity”, we should be exclusively preoccupied with the threshold to 
“decent human functioning”, and not with their relative position with respect to 
each other (ibíd.: 259 and 271). Among the many reasons why Blake considers co-
ercion the cornerstone of duties of global and domestic justice, I will draw on his 
account of private law, which for him is relevant insofar as it coercively defines 
which resources go to what activities (ibíd.: 282). Given this resource-allocating 
function of private law, that can affect each citizen’s opportunities to pursue her 
life plans, all those who are liable to a coercive government must have equal abili-
ties to influence its policies (ibíd.: 284). 
Some have argued that coercion theory is the “most promising” way for 
Rawlsian anti-cosmopolitans to ground their claims (Abizadeh, 2007: 345). Wheth-
er this is right or wrong, I will not discuss here. Neither will I try to question equal-
ity as a principle of redistribution, nor whether there should be any redistribution 
at all. For the sake of argument, I will take all that for granted and deal with Blake’s 
position directly. According to Blake, whenever the state allocates resources it’s 
affecting each citizen’s life chances, and private law allows some forms of “ad-
vantage-taking” to influence contractual outcomes and prohibits others (ibíd.: 278). 
This leads Blake to claim that relative shares should not have the effect of allowing 
certain state members to arrange economic institutions for their own benefit, 
therefore awarding privileges for themselves (ibíd.).  
In this essay I will argue that, given modern well-known developments in 
global economic interdependence, if Blake cares to avoid excessive advantage-
taking from arising as a consequence of private law, he should also accept that a 
concern for relative shares should exist globally. In the first section, I will refer to 
different manifestations of economic interdependence that I believe should make 
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us worry about relative deprivation internationally, for the same reasons why Blake 
believes we should care about it within the borders of each state. The second sec-
tion will deal with Blake’s view of international coercion, which takes states to be 
the only actors exercising it upon each other (Blake, 2011: 567). As a consequence 
of that assumption, Blake believes that, aside from granting decent levels of auton-
omy to everybody, global justice only demands that every state is free from coer-
cion by any other state. I will challenge this account of global relations, as I will try 
to argue that even if each state’s government negotiates international trade agree-
ments and regulations, equality should hold among citizens, and not only among 
states, in order for privileges not to arise in the global realm. Furthermore, I be-
lieve Blake gives too much weight to the particular form coercion takes within 
states as we know them nowadays. For the sake of consistency, I will affirm that he 
should grant that the same reasons why coercion gives rise to a concern with rela-
tive shares domestically also hold internationally. In the third section I will try to 
draw a line between institutional design and global distributive justice. Even if our 
world continues to be a world of states, as it seems likely, persons should be equal-
ly well-off in order for privileges not to arise when governments negotiate interna-
tional trade agreements and regulations.  
 
 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE  
AND HOW GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE RESOURCES 
 
Different practices and institutions have emerged in the global arena, especially 
towards the second half of the 20th century, that create a network of interdepend-
ence among their many participants. As Pogge has put it, the global economic sys-
tem is an «extremely complex network of agreements and treaties about trade, in-
vestment, loans, patents, copyrights, trademarks, taxation, labour standards, 
environmental protection, use of seared resources and much else» (2001: 12). The-
se connections of interdependence have a great capacity to produce benefits and 
burdens (Beitz, 1999: 152). I will now refer to some examples of how common 
global economic practices allocate resources and produce such benefits and bur-
dens.  
First, international economic institutions create incentives for economic 
behaviour. As Young points out, international practices and regulations encourage 
people in affluent countries to purchase products made through deep violations of 
human rights (2004: 375). At the same time, American corporations have systemat-
ically transferred significant portions of their capitalisation to places where labour 
costs are lower (Beitz, 1999: 144). Both consumer habits and the behaviour of cer-
tain corporations are means by which citizens and institutions in richer countries 
can have a deep impact in the standard of living of people in less developed areas 
of the world. Our current international economic order tends to incentivise prac-
tices that permit to take advantage from great income inequality. Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs), for example, have the capacity to increase inequality both 
internationally, as they have reassured that trade flows to those countries with a 
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higher disposition to lower their employment and consumer law standards, and 
domestically, as their distributional (often obscured) effects include regressing 
shifts in the distribution of wealth, which has flown to a small number of the larg-
est, most powerful, firms (Khan, 2014: 424). Thus, the combined action of power-
ful corporations and the trade interests of developed countries has contributed to 
incentivise behaviours in global markets that increase inequalities among those 
who live in affluent states and those who don’t. 
Second, changes in the price of some commodities can profoundly affect 
the lives and well-being of people living in certain states (Young, 2000: 248) that 
had nothing to do with the decision in question. Agricultural subsidies are a good 
example of how domestic governmental policies can impact people no matter 
whether they’re citizens of the state or not. For instance, funds transferred by EU 
and US institutions to support local farmers have undercut the ability of farmers in 
other (generally poorer) countries to compete (Caney, 2008: 503). This shows how 
trade, finance, investment and production, which are global in their implications, 
operate to make some people benefit more than others (see Young, ibíd.) while 
those most negatively affected by them cannot take part in relevant decision-
making processes.  
These differences in the distribution of benefits and burdens are common-
ly regarded as the result of power differentials between states. The regulative 
framework of World Bank credits, on which many developing countries rely and 
that has been set by industrial countries, represents a good example of rules that 
are coercively imposed upon weaker states globally (Beitz, 1999: 147). Now, coer-
cion doesn’t always appear in the form of direct force and the threat of sanctions 
by stronger states. For instance, international tax policy derives less from the appli-
cation of general guiding principles than from a combination of economic power 
and the pragmatic need to promote cross border activity to enhance domestic wel-
fare through international trade and investment (Cockfield, 2005: 151). The more a 
vulnerable state depends on maintaining trade relations, the less potential such a 
state will have for exiting (or refusing to enter) a commercial relationship un-
harmed3, since, as Hirschman (1945: 31) famously proclaimed, bargaining power is 
strongly dependent on each of the parties’ capacity to leave the relation at the low-
est risk possible. In addition, international economic relations take place in the 
context of an imbalance in the capacity to adapt to the conditions of the global 
economy, so that stronger actors can coerce weaker ones by establishing more and 
more demanding regulative frameworks (Hurrell, 2001: 43). All these are particular 
examples of how strong states can coerce weaker ones to accept a certain set of 
rules and standards that favours developed countries, by means of the threat to 
withdraw from trade relations.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Albert O. Hirschman's remarks on how exit opportunities influence bargaining power differentials in foreign 
trade were exceptionally applied to the institution of marriage by Susan Moller Okin in Justice, Gender and the 
Family, New York: Basic Books, 1989. 
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INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMIC COERCION: INTERDEPENDENCE BEYOND INTERSTATE 
ACTION 
 
Even though Blake acknowledges that rules and practices governing global 
economic interdependence (regarding, for instance, the non-voluntary membership 
in the World Trade Organisation) are the result of coercion between states (2011: 
557), he also claims that such coercion shouldn’t lead to the existence of egalitarian 
duties towards foreigners. The main reason for this is that in the global realm coer-
cion takes place “horizontally”, that is, on a state-to-state basis, so that there’s no 
single agent that can exercise coercion in a vertical way, as the state’s government 
does domestically (ibíd.: 566). Though international horizontal coercion demands 
that we develop some distributive justice principles, such principles need to be, for 
Blake, directed towards eliminating, and not justifying, coercion, so that every state 
in the world is granted “democratic self-government” (ibíd.: 567). Blake doesn’t 
reflect much on this principle, but it’s clear that it will not necessarily include 
(though it could prompt it if it was an unavoidable consequence of democratic 
self-government4) equality among citizens from different states. It could perfectly 
be the case, at least theoretically, that two states differed in their citizens’ income 
or well being, but both were able to act according to democratic self-government, 
so that we have no reason to disapprove of this form of inequality, in the eyes of 
Blake (ibíd.: 570). Even if we need further justice requirements (democratic self-
government) than our mere connection by common humanity would demand (suf-
ficient levels of autonomy guaranteed to all persons, regardless of how states relat-
ed to each other)5, Blake believes there’s still no need for a concern about relative 
deprivation among persons to arise globally.  
Now, if coercion only took place internationally on a state-to-state basis, per-
haps getting rid of horizontal coercion, as Blake proposes, would suffice to put the 
global economic system’s unfair allocation of resources to an end. But, from my 
perspective, Blake’s view of international coercion simplifies things too much. Co-
ercion takes place internationally in ways that go beyond agreements and interac-
                                                          
4 Blake acknowledges that we could value material equality internationally, but only as far as its absence was 
incompatible with the democratic self-government demanded by justice in the global realm (see Blake, 2011: 
567). This means that, by means of democratic self-government we could reach, as a sort of side effect, material 
equality among citizens of different states. Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that Blake accepts cosmopolitan 
conclusions at all. Rather, he claims that his view of global justice could lead to such a result, even if states 
continued to be the only agents exercising the type of coercion that prompts a concern for relative deprivation. 
Even if material equality arose among both co-citizens and foreigners, that wouldn't be as a consequence of 
our need to be preoccupied by relative deprivation globally, but rather of the elimination of unjustified coer-
cion exercised by powerful countries over weaker ones.  
5 Back in 2001, Blake claimed that "a concern for relative deprivation becomes an implication of liberal 
thought only when individuals share more than common humanity" (259-260). Of course, there's still a lot of 
room regarding what human beings share that is more than "common humanity", yet less than the coercive 
institutions of the state, since many kinds of connections could arise with an intensity that fluctuates between 
each point. One could perfectly wonder what kinds of justice concerns would arise from different levels of 
connection between individuals by means of the different intensity of the coercive institutions they share. 
Nevertheless, I do not intend to do that like that here.  
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tions between states. Within the global domain, even if there are no analogous 
conditions to those in which coercion happens domestically, a unified system of 
legal principles and rules that includes, for instance, property laws regulating how 
resources may be harvested from international waters, is in play (Tan, 2006: 330). 
Even though these laws were initially agreed by states, their affirmation no longer 
stems from historical agreement, but from general acceptance by the international 
society, so that they can come to generate expectations on their own for all its law-
ful members (ibíd.: 332). All these laws and principles create a system that goes 
beyond punctual agreements by states, and so makes it insufficient to eliminate 
horizontal state-to-state coercion. Once international laws are created, they acquire 
life of their own and later governments have no power to overturn them (Caney, 
2008: 498). Even if a given state decided, at some point, to withdraw its formal 
consent from international agreements, their ongoing effects would still constrain 
its actions.  
In the global realm, regardless of the absence of a single coercive agent of 
the sort of the state, the interplay of certain institutions and practices can allocate 
resources and affect fundamentally the lives of individuals. Coercion takes place 
globally by means of a “system of rules” that includes a broad set of phenomena 
ranging from formal institutions to informal social practices, stable patterns of 
interaction or a combination of these (Valentini, 2011: 212). Global coercion, in 
this sense, amounts to a type of what Valentini has categorised as “systemic coer-
cion” (ibíd.). In contrast with “interactional coercion”, characterised by the pres-
ence of a single agent coercing others, it’s impossible to attribute systemic coercion 
to a unitary institution (ibíd.: 213). Within this system of global relations, many ac-
tors such as consumers, producers and owners, who often have conflicting inter-
ests (Wenar, 2001: 91), interact in a way that determines relevantly each agent’s 
relative shares.  
Systemic and interactional coercion affect people’s lives in very different 
ways and, so, I believe Blake is right to point out that, even if coercion exists inter-
nationally, global institutions do not engage in the “same sort” (see Blake, 2001: 
265) of coercive practices on persons as the state. Nevertheless, I am doubtful as 
to whether we should give a lot of importance (if any) to the particular formal ways 
in which coercion takes place, as long as it affects individuals’ relative shares in a 
morally significant way. If the motives why private law is connected with distribu-
tive justice also hold within international institutions, there’s no point in focusing 
on the particularities of the mechanisms by which domestic coercion operates. 
Why should we accept, as Blake’s coercion theory of global justice implies, that 
what’s sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander? As Abizadeh points out, 
private law gives rise to distributive justice concerns because it regulates fundamen-
tal forms of social cooperation through enforcing an economic regime and creating 
entitlements to material holdings (2007: 355-6). If that is the case, coercively en-
forced interstate institutions and regimes that regulate the terms of production, 
exchange and distribution should prompt such concerns as well (ibíd.).  
Blake sometimes appears to defend his account of coercion theory on the 
basis that it has been a useful tool to distinguish between the local norms of dis-
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tributive justice and the universal norms of respect for autonomy (see, for instance, 
Blake, 2011: 565). But it’s very unclear why the usefulness of a theory to justify the 
status quo should be of any relevance from the point of view of justice. It’s true 
that Blake’s statism is a convenient way to support The institutional framework 
operating nowadays (Caney, 2008: 507), but one must wonder what moral grounds 
compel us to defend the status quo –at least in relation with our concern about the 
relative position of foreigners- in the first place. 
Furthermore, powerful actors have strong interests in making coercion less 
identifiable so that it works better for their own benefit. The international modus 
vivendi has the effect of perpetuating the absence of effective mechanisms to cre-
ate, enforce and apply international law (Pogge, 1989: 237). But that shouldn’t be a 
reason to discard a concern for relative deprivation in the global realm, as some-
times justice can demand precisely more dense and organised forms of coercion. In 
fact, state coercion itself (of the sort Blake has in mind) can be understood as a 
response to freedom-threatening unconstrained capitalism, a form of systemic, yet 
lawless, coercion that might already exists prior to the state (Valentini, 2011: 212-
5). Pevnick, for instance, refers to a prominent view within the literature of institu-
tional development that suggests that social actors produce social institutions in the 
process of seeking distributive advantage in the conflict over substantive benefits 
(2008: 404). Of course, as he goes on to claim, if this is true and the extent to 
which interaction is governed by coercive institutions depends on the relevant pre-
institutional power of each agent, it would be mistaken to claim that the same 
«powerful actors that have successfully and profitably blocked the development of 
coercive institutions governing capital flows» are also “excused” from attending to 
inequality between them and individuals in the same states where they invest 
(Pevnick, 2008: 406). Following a similar line of reasoning, Abizadeh has accused 
Blake of conflating the reasons why particular distributive justice duties should 
arise (“existence” conditions of justice) and the institutions and mechanisms that 
are necessary to materialise justice (“instrumental” conditions of justice, see 2007: 
321). As a consequence, Blake’s account of global justice allows the fact that pow-
erful actors mistreat individuals by coercing them “lawlessly” to count as a reason 
for denying them a concern with relative deprivation (ibíd.: 330 and 351).  
The existence of private law on the domestic level, therefore, is one of the 
means by which the state makes the allocation of resources more identifiable and 
cognisable for individuals. As a consequence of the presence of private law institu-
tions, citizens are able, domestically, to apprehend the ways in which the state allo-
cates resources and -at least within democratic states- influence resource-allocating 
policies. In the global realm, in contrast, there is a lack of institutions that can be 
controlled by the rule of law or any democratic means, and powerful actors who, 
within the current framework can do and undo at will, keep on blocking the ap-
pearance of means of channelled coercion capable of enhancing greater levels of 
what Young calls “discernability” (see, 2004: 386). In this context, the fact that 
coercion takes place internationally in a systemic and also less identifiable way 
should constitute a reason for more discernable coercion to arise, rather than a dis-
claimer from any moral concern about relative deprivation. Worldwide, we con-
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stantly face examples of failed states, of countries in which private actors impede 
an adequate enforcement of the rule of law and of institutional frameworks that 
make it impossible for individuals to discern and adequately apprehend the ways in 
which resources are allocated. Nevertheless, I believe that a liberal egalitarian con-
ception of justice like Blake’s would never accept that the uncertainty that exists in 
such situations could be yielded against those who demand equality among citizens 
of those countries to deny the appearance of a legitimate concern for relative dep-
rivation.  
 
 
STATE REPRESENTATION AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 
 
Arguing, as I have done so far, that the coercive effects of nowadays’ global eco-
nomic interdependence should give rise to a concern with relative deprivation does 
not commit me (or anyone), though, to a defence of a particular institutional 
framework on the international level. Currently unconstrained global economic 
coercion could be institutionalised in many different ways. For example, solutions 
could go in the direction of new supranational regulations aimed at managing in-
ternational fiscal or agricultural policy to reduce the negative effects of practices 
like international tax competition, and not necessarily towards a global Leviathan 
(Valentini, 2011: 218). The point is, nevertheless, that however we decide to insti-
tutionalise coercion internationally, citizens should be equally entitled, to the extent 
that they’re all under the deeply pervasive influence of the same (diffuse) set of 
institutions and practices with the capacity to allocate resources, to participate and 
influence the processes by which global economic rules are adopted. This, I be-
lieve, should still hold even if states were to keep on acting as the representatives 
of their citizens in the negotiation of international treaties and other legal instru-
ments. Some even believe that new forms of democracy on the international level 
have larger possibilities of success if they’re channelled through stronger democrat-
ic institutions within states, in which it’s less likely that delegation amounts to 
denying democratic control permanently (Dahl, 1994: 33). 
In a world of states in which national governments can bargain with each 
other the conditions of trade, citizens from different countries should still be 
equally able to pressure and influence their representatives. Actually, the form that 
representation takes should not undermine the existence of a concern with relative 
deprivation, since there can be a division of labour between different means of 
representation. Therefore, the fact that it’s states who in the end sign international 
treaties does not affect the need for equality to arise globally (Tan, 2006: 334). Ma-
terial inequality among citizens of different states might still prompt an unfair dif-
ference in their capacity to act in relevant ways that can condition the international 
decision making of their respective governments. That is especially the case for 
generally, as Pogge points out, economic inequality contributes significantly to the 
under-fulfilment of civil and political human rights associated with democratic 
government and the rule of law (Pogge, 2001: 8). More particularly, one could also 
imagine how, for instance, different levels of education (even assuming that all 
 
 
Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía 
Año 2017 Núm. 20. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 136-146 
 
144 
were above the minimum required for autonomy) could generate diverging capaci-
ties among citizens to grasp adequate knowledge of the content of international 
treaties and regulations that states negotiate. This is the case, especially, if we take 
into account that trade policy is a highly complex area that makes it hard for peo-
ple to participate meaningfully so that, for example, the EU discusses PTAs with 
developing countries asymmetrically in terms of technical and political power (Del 
Felice, 2012: 305-6).  
In a context in which the role of PTAs is becoming increasingly prominent 
in shaping international and regional trade (Khan, 2014: 423) citizens of different 
states should have at least roughly equal capacities to pressure and influence their 
governments regarding the content of such treaties. The recent negotiation of the 
Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has proved 
that civil society campaigns can change the discussion of issues like public pro-
curement and pharmaceutical patents, and can impede or delay the ultimate con-
clusion of a trade agreement (Trew, 2013: 569). Their lesser ability to raise well-
informed claims to their respective governments can disadvantage some citizens in 
their capacity to condition the terms that the parties finally agree.  
The need for an equal ability to influence the processes by which coercive 
institutions allocate resources plays an important role in Blake’s remarks on why 
private law gives rise to a concern with relative deprivation (2001: 284). One of the 
reasons for this is the need to eliminate “advantage-taking” or, as I prefer to say, 
“privileges” when we decide what resources go to which activities (ibíd.: 278). I 
accept, with Blake, that coercion plays an important role when we determine dis-
tributive duties because of its impact in the relative shares of individuals. Neverthe-
less, the reasons that explain why coercion gives rise to a concern for relative dep-
rivation have also served to other types of theories like “domination”, “political 
participation” or “pervasive impact” (see Caney, 2008: 490) to ground their claims 
about distributive justice. Even within institutions whose nature cannot be regard-
ed as coercive, to the extent that coercion theory relies on the deep, immediate and 
pervasive impact that certain arrangements have on people’s holdings and life pro-
spects (see Sangiovanni, 2012: 84) to explain what distributive duties are owed to 
individuals, impartiality and consistency demand, from my point of view, that, 
wherever those circumstances appear, coercion theorists like Blake accept the 
emergence of a concern with relative shares. Furthermore, wherever coercive insti-
tutions allocate resources in ways that determine each person’s relative shares no 
matter in what form, coercion theorists should grant, as well, that justice demands 
equality in order to avoid unfair privileges and advantages.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper I have engaged with some of the reasons why Blake’s coercion theory 
of global distributive justice demands that a concern about relative deprivation 
arises only within state institutions. Along these pages I have tried to defend that if 
we take such reasons as the grounds that make state coercion relevant, we should 
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care about relative deprivation also internationally. Institutions and practices that 
play a major role in global economic interdependence have an enormous capacity 
to decide what resources go where. As a consequence, even if the way they distrib-
ute benefits and burdens is one of a different sort from that of the state, formalism 
alone shouldn’t be a morally relevant reason to recognise different distributive enti-
tlements to citizens and foreigners. Nonetheless, even if I am right to suggest that 
taking the reasons why coercion matters within nation states seriously leads to an 
acknowledgement of egalitarian duties towards foreigners, neither coercion theo-
rists, nor statists in general should despair, as there might still be more promising 
ways to claim that we owe different things to co-citizens and aliens.  
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